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Detector control attacks on quantum key distribution systems exploit the linear mode of avalanche
photodiode in single photon detectors. So far, the protocols under consideration have been the
BB84 protocol and its derivatives. Here we present how bright tailored illumination exploiting the
linear mode of detectors can be used to eavesdrop on distributed-phase-reference protocols, such as
differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics theoretically allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to grow a private, secret key, even if the
eavesdropper Eve can do anything permitted by the laws
of nature [1–4]. The field of quantum key distribution
(QKD) has evolved rapidly in the last two decades, with
transmission distances reaching 250 km in the laboratory
[5], and commercial QKD systems available from several
vendors [6].
Even though QKD can be proved secure in theory
[3, 4, 7], the implementations may contain loopholes al-
lowing side-channel attacks. In fact, many such side-
channel attacks have been identified and countered, ei-
ther by modifying the implementation, generalizing the
security proof, or both [8–22]. The discoveries of im-
plementation loopholes does not prove the insecurity of
QKD, but rather its maturity. Scrutinizing the imple-
mentations is a vital step to achieve satisfactory security
in practical QKD.
Recently the detector control attacks [23–28] exploit-
ing the linear mode of avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
received considerable attention. This class of attacks
stands out from previous attacks since they allow the
eavesdropper Eve to copy the full key, while not being
revealed by monitored parameters, such as the quan-
tum bit error rate. Furthermore, the attacks are imple-
mentable with current technology. The loophole has been
identified in two commercial QKD systems [24], and the
full attack has been demonstrated under realistic con-
ditions on an experimental QKD setup [27]. Further-
more, it has been proved possible to keep the APDs in
the linear mode through blinding illumination for both
passively-quenched [23, 27], actively-quenched [28] and
gated APDs [24–26] through a variety of techniques.
So far these bright illumination detector control at-
tacks have been considered on the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [1] and its derivatives with similar im-
plementations, such as the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin
2004 (SARG04) [29], Ekert [2], six-state [30, 31], and de-
coy protocols [32–34]. Here we present how to exploit
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the linear mode of the detectors in distributed-phase-
reference protocols such as differential-phase-shift (DPS)
[35, 36] and coherent-one-way (COW) [37, 38] to trace-
lessly eavesdrop the full raw and secret key.
II. EAVESDROPPING ON LINEAR
DETECTORS
For the distributed-phase-reference protocols consid-
ered here, the implementation of Bob is ‘passive’ in the
sense that Bob does not use a modulator that introduces
randomness into his detection system (similarly to pas-
sive vs. active basis choice in the BB84 protocol [39]).
Detector control is easier for passive implementations,
since Eve does not have to deal with different possibilities
associated with Bob randomly selecting a measurement.
In a detector control attack, Eve measures the states
from Alice using a copy of Bob’s measurement device
(Bob′) to obtain a detection event. Eve resends a bright
trigger pulse targeting the detectors operated in the lin-
ear mode, and in a successful attack it causes the ex-
act same detection event in Bob’s measurement device
(see Fig. 1). Since Eve uses a copy of Bob, Bob’s detec-
tion statistics will be indistinguishable from the detection
statistics he obtains without any eavesdropper. There-
fore, Alice’s and Bob’s data will not reveal the eaves-
dropper. Furthermore, since Eve has an exact copy of
Bob’s detection results, the details of the protocol are
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FIG. 1. Scheme of a detector control attack: Eve measures the
states from Alice using a copy of Bob’s measurement device
(Bob′) to obtain a detection event. She then uses a faked-
state generator (FSG) [40] to generate a bright pulse tailored
to cause the same detection event in Bob.
2irrelevant: the security is broken for any classical post-
processing since Eve can listen to the classical channel
and perform the same post-processing on her copy of the
detection results. Therefore, the challenge in a detector
control attack is to find a way to make arbitrary detec-
tion events in Bob’s measurement device, given that the
detectors are accessible in the linear mode.
If the detectors are gated, it may be possible to access
them in the linear mode simply by sending the bright
states after the gate [26]. Otherwise it might be neces-
sary to blind the detectors, either with continuous illumi-
nation [24, 25] or different types of modulated blinding
[25, 28].
Regardless of how the linear mode is obtained, the de-
tectors have similar characteristics and have two impor-
tant parameters: Pnever is the maximum trigger pulse
power which never causes a click in any detector, and
Palways is the minimum trigger pulse power which always
causes a click in an arbitrary detector. For BB84 [1],
SARG04 [29] and decoy-protocols [32–34] the require-
ment for perfect detector control attacks is given by [24]
Palways < 2Pnever. (1)
Note that both Pnever and Palways seem to increase with
higher blinding illumination [24].
III. DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT
The upper right of Fig. 2 shows Bob’s measurement
device in the DPS protocol [35, 36], consisting of an un-
balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer and one detector
for each bit value. The length difference of the arms in
the interferometer matches the time difference between
two adjacent pulses sent by Alice. Alice sends a train
of coherent pulses and uses the phase difference between
two adjacent pulses to encode the two different bit val-
ues: 0 phase difference corresponds to the bit value 0 and
pi phase difference corresponds to the bit value 1.
For the DPS protocol, Eve’s faked-state generator
(FSG) is simply a copy of Alice’s optical scheme, but
the coherent pulses are brighter with amplitude Palways.
As we will see, the requirement for the detection thresh-
olds is the same as for the BB84 family of protocols,
given by Eq. 1. Assuming suitable detection thresholds,
an arbitrary detector at Bob in slot k can be triggered
by selecting the phase difference ϕk − ϕk−1:
ϕk − ϕk−1 =


(N + 1/2)pi causes a vacuum event,
2Npi causes a click in D0,
(2N + 1)pi causes a click in D1,
where N is an integer (see Fig. 2). Since Palways/2 hits
each detector for vacuum events, the requirement for per-
fect eavesdropping is given by Eq. (1).
If Bob accepts at least two vacuum events between ev-
ery detection event, for instance due to low transmission
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FIG. 2. Detector control in a DPS implementation: Eve’s
FSG consists of a laser source producing a train of coherent
pulses with amplitude Palways, and a phase modulator (PM).
Eve controllably causes identical detection events in Bob by
an appropriate phase ϕ in each pulse. No trigger pulse is
applied to the left of the diagram, nor in the first slot.
in the quantum channel or detector deadtime, Eve can
relax the requirement (1) further. Then she does not send
a train of pulses, but rather for each detection event she
sends two pulses with the appropriate phase difference.
Then Palways/4 hits the detectors in the slots before and
after the detection event.
If blinding is necessary, one can use a blinding light
source with a coherence length less than the length dif-
ference of the interferometer arms to illuminate both de-
tectors equally.
IV. COHERENT-ONE-WAY
The upper right of Fig. 3 shows Bob’s measurement
device in the COW protocol [37, 38], consisting of a
fiber-optic coupler or a beam-splitter with splitting ratio
tB : (1−tB), followed by a detector DB to generate secret
key. The other output of the fiber-optic coupler leads to
an unbalanced interferometer identical to the one in the
DPS protocol. It has two monitoring detectors DM1 and
DM2 to check for eavesdropping, by checking the coher-
ence of adjacent pulses. To generate key, Alice sends a
train of pulses which are grouped in pairs. In each pair,
the slot absent of a pulse determines the bit value of the
key. The exact details of the protocol are irrelevant, as
long as Eve can transparently mirror her detection events
onto Bob’s detectors.
As we will see, for perfect eavesdropping against COW,
it is necessary for Eve to obtain different trigger pulse
thresholds for the data detector DB, and the monitor-
ing detectors DM0 and DM1. Palways,B and Pnever,B are
the thresholds for the data detector while Palways,M and
Pnever,M are the thresholds for the monitoring detectors.
The monitoring detectors have exactly the same setup
as for DPS, and therefore they can be controlled as de-
scribed in the previous section. However, since only
(1 − tB) of the trigger pulse power enters the interfer-
ometer of the monitoring detectors, the amplitude of
the pulse train must be increased to Palways,M/(1 − tB).
3For perfect control, it is important that the illumination
which enters the other arm does not trigger the data de-
tector. This requires that
tB
1− tB
Palways,M < Pnever,B. (2)
The data detector can be triggered by increasing the am-
plitude of the trigger pulse to Palways,B/tB. Then how-
ever, it is crucial that the monitoring detectors are not
triggered. To minimize the illumination on the moni-
toring detectors, phase difference is set to pi/2, and the
threshold requirement is given by
1− tB
tB
Palways,B < 2Pnever,M, (3)
where the factor 2 represents that the illumination is split
between the two monitoring detectors, just as the factor
appearing in Eq. (1). Again, if there are at least two
vacuum events between every detection event, the factor
2 can be replaced by 4. Furthermore, some COW imple-
mentations use only one monitoring detector [5, 41]. In
that case the requirement (3) can be relaxed even fur-
ther, since most of the illumination can be directed to
the unused interferometer output during vacuum events.
To see what the requirements (2) and (3) means in
practice, they can be rewritten to
Pnever,B >
tB
1− tB
Palways,M, (4a)
Palways,B < 2
tB
1− tB
Pnever,M. (4b)
Now let us assume the reasonable values [24, 25]
Pnever,M = 400µW, and that Palways,M = 500µW for the
monitoring detectors. Table I lists different constraints
on the data detector thresholds for various values of tB,
where tB = 0.5 and tB = 0.9 have been reported in exper-
iments [5, 38, 41]. With tB close to 1, the thresholds for
the data detector must be very much higher than for the
monitoring detectors. If blinding illumination is applied,
the data detector will receive a larger fraction of the il-
lumination which would usually cause higher thresholds
[24] than for the monitoring detectors. If a fiber-optic
coupler is used, Eve may increase the threshold differ-
ence even further by using a blinding wavelength outside
the working range of the coupler, blinding the data detec-
tor even deeper [42]. In the implementations with only
TABLE I. Data detector thresholds for various values of
tB, given by Eq. 4 for Pnever,M = 400µW and Palways,M =
500µW.
tB Pnever,B > Palways,B <
0.5 500µW 800µW
0.8 2000µW 3200µW
0.9 4500µW 7200µW
0.95 9500µW 15200µW
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FIG. 3. Detector control in a COW implementation: Eve’s
FSG consists of a laser source producing a train of coher-
ent pulses, an intensity modulator (IM) and a phase modula-
tor (PM). The lower part of the figure shows an example of
detector control, where the system parameters are assumed
to be tB = 0.5, Pnever,M = 400µW, Palways,M = 500µW,
Pnever,B = 600µW and Palways,B = 750µW. The dashed
lines in the diagram are the detector thresholds. Eve con-
trollably causes identical detection events in Bob by an ap-
propriate phase ϕ and amplitude in each pulse. The trigger
pulse amplitude is 2Palways,M = 1000 µW, and is increased to
2Palways,B = 1500µW to trigger the data detector. No trigger
pulse is applied to the left of the diagram, nor in the first slot.
one monitoring detector, Eve can control the amount of
blinding illumination at it independently from the data
detector, by splitting the blinding illumination arbitrarily
between the output ports of the interferometer. However,
how much higher thresholds it is possible to achieve for
the data detector than the monitoring detectors remains
an open question. Note that for values of tB close to 1,
it should be straightforward for Eve to trigger the data
detector while keeping the monitoring detectors silent.
Therefore, it is important to check for the absence of
clicks in the monitoring detectors.
Eve’s FSG is nearly a copy of Alice’s optical scheme;
in addition it includes a phase modulator to control
the monitoring detectors. Eve emits a train of coher-
ent pulses with amplitude Palways,M/(1 − tB). To make
the data detector click, the amplitude is increased to
Palways,B/tB. One of the monitoring detectors in slot
k can be triggered by selecting the phase difference
ϕk − ϕk−1:
ϕk − ϕk−1 =


(N + 1/2)pi causes a vacuum event,
2Npi causes a click in DM2,
(2N + 1)pi causes a click in DM1,
where N is an integer. Since the data detector and the
monitoring detectors are controlled independently, it is
straightforward to cause a simultaneous click in the data
detector and one of the monitoring detectors. Figure 3
shows Eve’s FSG, and an example of detector control.
4V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have derived the requirements (1) and (4) for a per-
fect attack on DPS and COW assuming that Eve must
introduce a click deterministically in Bob. However, if
the line between Alice and Bob is lossy, Eve might place
her Bob′ closer to Alice, and receive more detections than
Bob would expect. To simulate this loss, instead of ap-
plying Palways, Eve can reduce the power in the trigger
pulses to a level which triggers the detector with a prob-
ability equal to the expected transmittance. This relaxes
the requirements (1) and (4).
Since the detector threshold requirement (1) has been
obtained using numerous techniques [24–26], the DPS
protocol is obviously vulnerable to the bright illumina-
tion attack. For the COW protocol, the requirements (4)
on the detector thresholds depend on the splitting ra-
tio between the data and monitoring detectors. Routing
more light to the data detector increases the required dif-
ference in detection thresholds. It remains an open ques-
tion for which splitting ratios suitable detector thresh-
olds can be obtained. However, it seems that the bright
illumination attacks represent a significant threat to the
security of the COW protocol, and all subsequent imple-
mentations should be investigated thoroughly.
While several countermeasures have been proposed
[23–27, 43], none of them have been proved secure [44]
to our knowledge. The same countermeasures should ap-
ply to the distributed-phase-reference protocols. A fre-
quently mentioned countermeasure is a power meter at
Bob’s entrance. As long as this countermeasure has not
been proven secure, it has to be considered insufficient
[25, 44]. Nevertheless, it makes life harder for Eve.
We have shown that distributed-phase-reference pro-
tocols DPS and COW are vulnerable to bright tailored
illumination attacks. This emphasizes the generality of
these attacks, and demonstrates the importance of scru-
tinizing all implementations and protocols thoroughly, as
this is a vital step for obtaining suitable practical security
for QKD.
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